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INT RODUCTION
Uncertainty is always present in modeling realistic sit uations. It may stem from a lack of knowledge, the in completeness or the unreliability of the information at our disposal. In orJer to draw a meaningful conclusion under uncertain situations, we may have to express our beliefs in a number of propositions. Many approaches have been proposed for representing, measuring, and reasoning with uncertain information. Despite the di versities of these methods, one can divide them into two classes: the quantitative (numeric) and the quali tative (non-numeric) approaches (Bhatnagar and and Kana!, 1986; Spiegelhalter, 198G; Satoh, 1989) . In the quantitative approach, a number is associated with each proposition to indicate the degree to which one believes in that proposition. That is, we express our belief in a proposition by a numeric value. To make the quantitative representation of beliefs consistent and meaningful, certain axioms or rules should be observed in expressing one's beliefs. For example, if beliefs are measured by a probability function, the Kolmogorm axioms for probability should be satisfied in order to maiutain consistency. In the qualitative approach, be liefs are expressed by a preference relation on a set of propositions. As in quantitative measures of beliefs, such a relation must be consistently defi ned. For ex ample, if a person believes more in proposition A than in proposition B, and also believes more in B than in C, then it is reasonable to assume that he would believe more in A than in C. In this paper, we are interested in those belief structures which are compat ible with some well known belief measures.
Both the quantitative and qualitative approaches arc very useful for the management of uncertainty. In fact, probability theory has been extensively studied within the quantitative as well as the qualitative frameworks (Fishburn, 1970; Savage, 1972; Fine, 1973) . Given a belief measure and a preference relation, an impor tant question one inevitably would ask is whether they are compatible with each other. This is indeed one of the fundamental issues in measurement theory, which is concemed to a large extent with the mathemati cal modeling of preferences and beliefs (French, 1986) . Depending on the context, a preference relation is also referred to as a comparative probability, possibility, or belief relation. The compatibility of a comparative probability relation and a probability function was in vestigated by many authors (Fishburn, 1970; Savage, 1972; Fine, 1973) . Dubois (1986) studied the com patibility of a comparative possibility relation and a possibility function. Possibility functions were origi nally proposed by Zadeh (1978) within the framework of fuzzy sets, and they were later shown to be closely related to consonant belief functions introduced in the theory of evidence (Shafer, 1976) . Wong et a!. (1990) studied the compatibility of a comparative belief re lation and a belief function. There is an important. class of preference relations referred to as qualitative probability (Savage, 1972) . However, until now it is not known which class of belief functions is compat ible with qualitative probability relations. Recently, Smets (1988) proposed a generalized version of belief functions. It is interesting to investigate what kind of preference relation is compatible with Smets' general ized belief functions.
In this paper, our discussion will focus on the compat ibility of quantitative and qualitative representations of beliefs. In particular, we analyze four cla%es of quantitative belief measures, namely, the probability function, the monotonic belief function, Shafer's belief function, and Smets' generalized belief function, and their compatibility with different kinds of preference relations. We will show that qualitative probability relations are compatible with monotonic belief func tions, and that a preference stmctme slightly weaker than that of qualitative belief is compatible with gen eralized belief functions. 1\' lore importantly, we believe that the study of the compatibility of these qualitative and quantitative representations of belief . � may provide a foundation for developing a generalized utility theory (Jaffray, 1989) .
2

QUANTITATIVE BELIEF MEASURES
Based on the notion of belief functions (Shafer, 1976 ), we will identify four different classes of quantitative measures of belief.
Let e = { 01, ..• , IJ,} denote a finite set of possible an swers to a question, which is referred to as the frame of discernment or simply the frame defined by the ques tion. Following the convention of representing a propo sition by a subset of e, the power set 2° denotes the set of all propositions discerned by frame e. A quanti tative belief measure can be viewed as a mapping from 2° to the real numbers.
Definition 1: A probability function Pis a mapping from 2° to the interval [0, 1), P : 2° -[0, 1), which satisfies the following axioms:
?(0) = 0, P(e) = 1, For A, BE 2° with An B = 0, P(A U B)= P(A) + P(B).
Axiom (B3) is usually referred to as the additit,ity ax iom. By replacing this axiom with the sup-additive axiom, another cla�s of quantitative belief measures called belief functions (Shafer, 1976) can be defined as follows.
Definition 2: A belief function Bel IS a mapping from 2° to the interval [0, 1), Bel : 2° -[0, 1), which satisfies (Bl), (B2), and the sup-additive axiom:
(B3') For every integer n > 0 and
nAn).
A belief function can be equivalently defined by a map ping from 2° to the interval [0, 1), m : 2° __, [0, 1] . which is called a basic probability assignment satisfy ing the axioms:
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In terms of the basic probability assignment, the belief in a proposition A E 2° can be expressed as:
where the summation is restricted to the elements /l in 2°, which are subsets of A. Conversely, given a be lief function one can construct the corresponding ba sic probability assignment. Therefore, belief function" can be defined either by axioms (B1),(B2), and (B:3') or by axioms (M1)-(M3).
Axioms (B1) and (B2) state that the proposition 0 is believed to be false (impossibility) and the proposi tion e is believed to be true (certainty). These two ax ioms indicate that the closed world assumption (Smets, 1988) is in fact used to define the frame of discernment e. That is, one has implicitly assumed that the frame e consists of all possible answers to a given question and only one of these answers is correct. On the other hand, axiom (B3') indicates that belief functions are sup-additive, and become additive in the degenerated case. Thus, additive probability functions belong to the class of degenerated belief functions.
Note that the additivity axiom implies the monotonic ity axiom, namely:
However, monotonicity does not imply additivity, and axioms (B1), (B2), and (B3') do not imply monotonic ity. This means that belief functions do not necessarily satisfy axiom (B4). In some applications, it is desirable that the monotonicity axiom (B4) is satisfied (Savage, 1972) . In that case, we can define another class of be lief measures, which falls between the belief functions and the probability functions. We will show that monotonic belief functions are com patible with the qualitative probability t·elations.
Smets ( 1988) With the open world assumption, the probability mass m(0) can be interpreted as the belief commit ted exactly to the proposition that the true answer is not in the frame e. Smets' belief functions, written bel, satisfy the fol lowing axioms:
.
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The condition m(0) > 0 has also been considered by Dubois and Prade (1986) under a set-theoretic view of belief functions. The generalized belief functions can be equivalently defined as follows. In the above discussion, we have considered four classes of quantitative belief measures: the probability function, the monotonic belief function, Shafer's be lief function, and Smets' generalized belief function.
The relationships between these measures are shown in Figure 1 . The set of probability functions is a sub set of the set of monotonic belief functions, and so on.
In the following section, we will study the preference structures that are compatible with these quantitative belief measures.
3
PREFERENCE REL ATIONS VERSUS QUANTITATIVE BELIEF MEASURES
In the qualitative representation of beliefs, it is as sumed that one is able to express one's preference on any two propositions A, B E 2°, without stat ing numerically how much one prefers proposition A to proposition B. Qualitative judgments can be de scribed in terms of a preference relation>--. By A>--B.
we mean that A is preferred to B. In the absence of strict preference, i.e., �(A >--B) and �(B >--A), we say that A and B are indifferent, written A � B. We also write A� B if A>--Bo rA � B. The relationship be tween the quantitative and qualitative representations of beliefs can be formally stated as follows.
Definition 5: Suppose 0 is a frame, J is a function mapping the elements of 2° onto the set of real num bers, and >--is a preference relation on 2°. vVe say that f and >--are compatible with each other if for A, BE 2°,
A function f is said to represent >--if it is compatible with )--.
Clearly, whether a preference relation is compatible with a particular quantitative belief measure depends very much on the preference structure representing the qualitative judgments.
Now consider a special class of preference relations characterized by the following two axioms:
Axiom (Q1) suggests that if one commits more belief in A than in B, one should not at the same time com mit more belief in B than in A. If this axiom holcb for a preference relation >--, then for every A, B E 2°. A � B <==: :> �(B >--A). Axiom (Q2) demands that if one does not commit more belief in A than in B, nor commits more belief in B than in C, one should not commit more belief in A than in C. A preference relation >-satisfying these two axioms is called a weak order which can be represented by a real-valued func tion (Fishburn, 1970; Roberts, 1976 A special type of preference relation known a$ qualita tive probability was studied extensively in probability theory (de Finetti, 1937; Fishburn, 1970 ; Savage, UJ72; Dubois, 1986).
Definition G: Let 8 be a frame. A preference rela tion>-defined on 2° is called a qualitative probability relation if it satisfies (QI), (Q2) and the following ad ditional axioms: for A, B, C E 2°, (Q3) nontriviality : 8 >-0, (Q4) improbability of impossibilit.y : -.(0 >-A), (Q5) monotonicity : (Au IJ) nc"' 0 = (A>-B <:=:?Au C >-13 u C).
Axioms (Q1)-(Q5) are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee the existence of a probability function (Kraft, Pratt., and Seidenberg, 1959) . Scott (196·1) gave the necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex istence of a probability function for a finite set. Let ItA denote the characteristic function of a subset A of 8 such that JlA(O) = 1 if 0 E A, and p,1(0) = 0 otherwise. Scott's theorem can be stated as follows. This means that axiom (S) implies axiom (Q5) if axioJJI (Q1) holds.
Theorem 2 only suggests the existence of a probabil ity function; there may exist functions other than the probability functions, which are also compatible with a preference relation satisfying (Ql), (Q3), (Q4), and (S).
Since probability functions are a special type of be lief functions, it is expected that there exists a weaker preference structure for belief functions. Axiom (Q3) eliminates the trivial preference relation, i.e., A� B for all A, BE 2°. The dominance axiom (Q1') says that one should not commit more belief in a subset than in the set itself. This axiom is stronger than (Q4). Given the axioms (Q1) and (Q2) of a. weak order, the dominance axiom can be expressed equiv alently M A 2 B = A � B. Obviously, axiom (Q5') is a weaker form of the monotonicity axiom (Q5 ).
It is important to note that (Q1)-(Q3) together with (Q4')-(Q5') form a set of independent axioms which completely characterize the qualitative belief relations. The following theorem (Wong et a!., 1990) shows that qualitative belief relations are indeed compatible with belief functions. if and only if the preference relation � is a qualitative belief relation.
We can prove the only if part of the theorem trivially from the properties of belief functions. The if part of the theorem can be proved by constructing a belief function compatible with a qualitative belief relation. Axioms (Q1) and (Q2) imply that the induced indif ference relation� is an equivalence relation ( Fishbum, 1970) . Since axiom (Q5) holds, based on the relation
we can partition 2° into at least two equivalence classes Eo, ... , Ek (k 2': 1 ). Au equivaleuce E, is also denoted as [A] if A E E,. For example, Eo may be writ ten as [0] and Ek as [8] . First we rccmsi,· cly construct. a function f on the equivalence elasses as follows:
if for every A E En+I, A :::J B ===> B ¢ En+ I ; oth erwise f' (E n + I ) = f(En) + l. The symbol I ·I de notes the cardinality of a set. The function thus con structed may be considered as an unnormali:ed belief function which satisfies
for A, B E 2°. Based on the function }', we can then construct a normalized belief function:
Theorem 3 shows that if a preference relation is a qualitative belief, i.e., it satisfies axioms ( Q I)-( Q:3), (Q4'), and (Q5'), then there exists a belief function compatible with the relation. However, these axioms do not guarantee that the class of belief functions is the only kind of functions representing qualitative be lief (Smets, 1990 ). As we mentioned earlier, the same can be said about Scott's theorem. For example, con sider a preference relation defined by {01, 112} � {02} � { O I} >-0. Obviously, this relation satisfies the ax ioms for qualitative belief as well as those required by Scott's theorem. It can be represented either by a probability function:
or by a belief function:
This relation can also be represented by another func tion f which is neither a probability function nor a belief function:
Certaintly, it will be useful if one can define a set of axioms to characterize a class of preference relations that can be represented only by belief functions. This may, however, be a difficult task in general. For a spe cial type of belief functions known as consonant belief functions, Dubois ( 1 986) gave such a set of axioms.
Based on Definition 7 and Theorem 3, we can now show that the qualitative probability relations are in fact compatible with the monotonic belief functions as defined by Definition 3.
Lemma 1. Suppose 8 is a finite set and >-a prefer ence relation on 28. If� is a qualitative probability relation, it is also a qualitative belief relation.
Proof: Axioms (Ql), (Q2), and (Q3) are satisfied by both qualitative probability and belief relations. Also. (Q5') is a weaker version of the monotonicity axiom (Q.5). Thus, it will suffice to prove that the dom inance axiom (Q4') follows from those axioms that define qualitative probability. Suppose A 2 B. Let A = B U C and B n C = 0. From •(0 � C) and axiom (Q5), it follows that the dominance axionr holds. Therefore, if a preference relation is a qualita tive probability relation, it is also a qualitative belief relation. 
That is, the monotonicity axiom (Q5) holds.
(if) From Lemma 1, we know that a qualitative prob ability relation is also a qualitative belief relation. By Theorem 3, there exists a belief function Bel satisfy ing the condition: A >-B {=} IJel(A) > Bcl(IJ) for A, B E 2°. From the monot.onicity axio111 (Q5), we have: for An C = I3 n C = 0,
This means that Bel satisfies axiom (B•l). 0
Note that axioms (B1) and (B2) imply axiom (Q:3), i.e., 8 >-0. Thus, (Q3) may be weakened or elimi nated under the open world assumption. In fact, the following theorem shows that the preference structure compatible with the generalized belief functions ca11 be defined by a set of axioms without (Q:)). (Wong, Bollmann, and Yao, 1990) . In this case, we can construct a generalized belief function by letting m(0) = 1. That is, according to (M3'), bel(A) = 0 for all A. E 2°. For this belief function bel, the con clition A >-B {=} bel(A) > bel(B) holds for any A, BE2°.
0
The results of the compatibility of preference relations and belief measures are summarized in Figure 2 . It ca11 be seen that the inclusion relation C between differclll classes of quantitative belief measures corresponds to the implication relation = between different sets or axioms defining the various preference relations. The links established here between these belief measures and preference relations provide a better understand ing of modeling uncertainty with beliefs.
In this preliminary investigation, we have not consiu ered all the important classes of belief functions. It is worth mentioning here that Dubois (1986) proposed a set of axioms to characterize consonant belief func tions. A more detailed analysis of various types of preference relations will be reported in a subsequctlt. paper.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the compatibility of quan titative and qualitative representations of beliefs. In particular, four classes of quantitative belief measures were analyzed, namely, the probability function, the monotonic belief function, Shafer's belief funct.ion, and Smets' generalized belief function. \Ve estab lished their individual compatibility with different be lief structures. These compatibility relationships not only provide a justification for the use of these quan titative measures, but also alleviate some of the diffi culties in the acquisition and interpretation of numeric belief numbers.
We have shown that the qualitative probability struc ture is compatible with monotonic belief functions, and a belief structure slight.ly weaker than that of qual itative belief is compatible with Srnet.s' generalized be lief functions. More importantly, the qualitative and quantitative representations of beliefs rnay lead to the development of a generalized utility theory for decision making with belief functions.
